Okay, look. Most "Neodyme Audit" guides out there treat it like some magic button you press and boom, your Solana project's secure. That's bullshit. Neodyme isn't a tool you "use" like that-it's a top tier auditing firm that tears apart your smart contracts to find the nasty bugs before hackers do. The real fuck up? People think skipping their manual review means you're good. Nope. Their audits catch shit like signature bypasses that drain funds, and you gotta know how to prep for it right, or you'll waste everyone's time and still launch a rug prone mess.
In my experience, projects that treat Neodyme like a checklist fail hard. You need to get your code audit ready first. Why? Their team dives deep into Solana specifics-account confusions, missing signer checks, all that jazz. Get that wrong, and you're just paying for a "you're screwed" report.
Neodyme's these Swiss security wizards who've audited tons of Solana projects, like deBridge back in 2022. They check your contracts for critical holes: front running, rug pulls, DoS attacks, you name it. Picture this-they found a critical signature verification bypass in deBridge where attackers could fake oracle sigs and steal bridged funds. Crazy, right? That's their level.
But here's the thing. It's not free. Expect fees around 0.3% of your TVL or flat rates starting at a few grand, depending on scope. Gas? Solana's cheap-~0.000005 SOL per tx during audit testing. Honest talk: if your project's small, might not be worth it yet. Build something solid first.
DIY with X Ray or poc framework? Cool for basics, but Neodyme's humans spot the weird edge cases.
Before emailing Neodyme, don't be that dev who submits spaghetti. I usually start by hunting the big five Solana pitfalls they always flag.
Missing ownership checks? Killer. Your contract trusts an account, but skips verifying AccountInfo::owner matches your program_id. Attacker fakes it, drains vaults. Fix: slap in a helper like this:
fn checkowner(account: &AccountInfo, expectedowner: &Pubkey) -> Result<()> { if account.owner != expected_owner { return Err(ProgramError::InvalidAccountOwner); } Ok(())
}
Signer checks next. Admin instruction? Check issigner or funds vanish. Sound familiar? Happened in that level0 PoC where hackers withdrew without auth.
And replay protection-use PDAs with canonical bumps. deBridge got hit 'cause users picked their own bumps, creating dupes to block claims. Always Pubkey::findprogram_address it yourself.
Potential issue: truncated Solana logs during testing. Nonce lost? Replay chain manually via RPC. Annoying, but fixable.
Neodyme's methodology is gold. They rule out classics first.
| Pitfall | Example from deBridge | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Signature Bypass | Secp256k1 offsets mismatch-fake msgs via memo IX | Read msg directly from Secp IX, verify offsets |
| Non Unique Bumps | User specified seeds = DoS via dupes | Canonical bump via findprogramaddress |
| Account Creation DoS | Anyone creates submission accounts, blocks redemptions | Ownership test + safe create wrapper |
| Broken Fallbacks | External calls fail, lock funds-no attacker proof revert | makefallbackforexternalcall IX |
| Missing Discriminators | Fake storage accounts for external calls | Add Anchor discriminators |
Look at that table. Criticals like sig bypass? Loss of funds imminent. Mediums block usability. They classify sharp.
Why does this matter? Solana's runtime quirks-lamports at 0.000000001 SOL, writable flags, off curve PDAs-trip everyone. Neodyme tests invoke_signed calls, CPI safety, arithmetic overflows.
Say you're building a bridge. Here's how I'd Neodyme proof it.
Issue: SPL token verifies missing? Add 'em. Rent exemption? Assert always.
Grab poc framework. Set up states: deploy program, create authority/user/hacker accounts. Deposit 1 SOL to vault. Then exploit missing owner check-withdraw as hacker. Logs show vault empty, hacker up 2 SOL. Brutal lesson.
Report lands. Criticals resolved? Verify. But upgrade auth still holds power-monitor it. I usually multisig that shit.
Launch? Announce audit proudly. "Neodyme cleared us-no sig bypasses, no DoS." Builds trust.
Common trap: ignoring "Info" findings. Truncated logs? Plan recovery-no historical data via RPC, so manual nonce hunts.
Small project? 2 weeks, ~$10k. Big like deBridge? Month, $50k+. Fees dynamic-protocol auth can tweak 'em post audit, watch that.
Cheaper alt? Their workshop at workshop.neodyme.io. Free ish Solana security crash course. Do it before submitting.
Solana logs truncate. Event data partial? Chain replay only fix. No RPC history.
Arithmetic? u64 overflows silent. Use checked_add.
Front running? Instruction introspection for sigs.
In my experience, 80% issues are account confusions. PDAs everywhere. Owner + signer checks on every untrusted AccountInfo.
Okay, one more. Casting truncation-u16 to u8? Boom. Always match types.
Run x ray --analyzeAll . It'll flag potentials. Then poc it.
Neodyme flags upgrade risks. Solana contracts upgradable by default. Authority swaps code? Powerful, dangerous. Multisig it, renounce if immutable.
deBridge kept theirs-fine for flexibility, but audit changes too.
What's next? Fix, re audit if major. Launch secure.
Reverse engineer your own binary. Solana CLI disassemble, decompile. solana test validator tx sends. Match logic?
Questions? Hit their site. But prep hard-you'll save cash and headaches.
That's it. Go build safe. Your users thank you later.